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Abstract. Big Data has the potential to enable unprecedentedly rigorous quantitative 
modeling of complex human social relationships and social structures. When such models 
are extended to nonhuman domains, they can undermine anthropocentric assumptions 
about the extent to which these relationships and structures are specifically human. 
Discoveries of relevant commonalities with nonhumans may not make us less human, but 
they promise to challenge fundamental views of what it is to be human. 
 
Introduction. 
 Humanistic discussions of the implications of Big Data for people have largely 
focused on ethical and legal issues raised by the gathering, control, and use of the data 
generated when people use information technology. Controversy over the gathering and 
use of telephone metadata from ordinary U.S. citizens is a case in point (Mayer et al. 
2016). The issue raised by this paper is more foundational: what does Big Data imply for 
our conception of what it is to be human? This issue arises from the combination of the 
new availability of real-world data from human social networks with new developments 
in network science. The interaction makes more likely the discovery of unexpected 
similarities between humans and nonhumans at the social level, raising in vivid new form 
the problem of understanding what makes us human beyond having Homo sapiens DNA.  
 
Part 1. Big Data and Human Behavior 
Big Data is voluminous data – so much data that standard data management tools 
cannot be used to create, capture, store, search, analyze, and visualize it in ways that are 
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useful, relevant, accurate, and timely (Gantz and Reinsell 2011).1 The Big Data of 
interest here is that generated by or about people and their social relationships. For 
example, we create such data when we count our steps using wearable personal 
technology (Stahl et al. 2010) or make a purchase, tweet, or search online using 
interactive or networked technology. We also have a "digital shadow" – information 
created about each of us based on the information we create (Gantz and Reinsell 2011).  
However, mainstream definitions of Big Data don't always capture its importance. 
When considering the implications of Big Data, size is relative. A dataset can be much 
bigger in breadth and depth (or detail) relative to the size and scope of the datasets that a 
potential user usually has access to. An inability to manage such datasets may a relevant 
problem for the purposes of monetization or business efficiency, but not for other 
purposes. In particular, Big Data enables social scientists to explore social interactions in 
previously unavailable ways. For example, digital shadows provide "outstandingly large" 
samples of real behavior to which social scientists have not previously had access 
(Bentley et al. 2014). Social network analysis is not new, but the availability of data 
harvested from or experimentally induced in enormous real-world social networks is. 
This availability makes possible a transition from sociological network theory based on 
one-time, often self-reported, data from dozens of people, to a “computational social 
science” based on massively longitudinal datasets of millions of people that offer “a 
qualitatively new perspective on collective human behavior” (Lazer et al. 2009: 722). 
Social scientists can now run randomized experiments involving millions of people and 
                                                
1This mainstream definition (e.g. Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_data) is 
one of many (Press 2014). However, nearly all emphasize size (without specifying size 
quantitatively) and the difficulty of managing it. 
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their relationships to test hypotheses of social behavior – for example, hypotheses about 
the roles of influence and susceptibility to influence in social contagions and the 
individual and local-network features associated with influence and susceptibility to 
influence (Aral and Walker 2012; Salganik et al. 2006). Running a social science 
experiment with even 14,000 participants, as in Salganik et al. 2006, is completely 
intractable in a physical lab.  
Social scientists can also study behavior in large real-world social systems 
without having to rely on sampling – for example, analyzing patterns in downloads of 
apps by 50 million Facebook users (Onnela and Reed-Tsochas 2010), the dynamics of 
collective attention as measured by 1 million users rating stories at a user-contributed 
news website (Wu and Huberman 2007), or the interplay of structural constraints and 
individual preferences in homophily (the tendency of like to associate with like) in a 
30,000-member university community, as measured by over 40,000 time-stamped emails 
(Kossinets and Watts 2009). Exploration of social networks via technological means is 
considered the tip of the iceberg in terms of socially-relevant data of interest to social 
scientists, given the growth in mobile devices, wearable technology, and brain-computer 
interfaces (Roesch et al 2014: 97). In short, for the social sciences, Big Data is data of 
"unprecedented breadth and depth and scale" generated by real-time, real-size social 
networks and the individuals in them (Lazer et al 2009). 
At the same time, computer scientists and other quantitative researchers are 
exploring network behavior at a more abstract level of analysis (Baronchelli et al. 2013; 
Bullmore and Sporns 2009; Barabasi and Albert 1999). In the emerging interdisciplinary 
network science, researchers are finding that similar network behavior arises at multiple 
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scales – from the Internet to the brain to metabolic reactions to scientific collaborations. 
Networks within individuals (e.g., brains) and networks between individuals (e.g., social 
networks) exhibit deep similarities. In addition, human social networks share at least a 
basic structure with other large-scale networks in different domains, such as having a few 
highly connected nodes (hubs) and many nodes with very few connections. Structural 
features even this basic can have important social effects, such as whether information is 
communicated through a network in ways that facilitate or hinder decision-making 
(Mason et al. 2008). Quantitative network models have also been developed to reveal 
basic features of the formation and structure of collaborative networks in the arts and 
sciences (Guimera et al. 2005) and to demonstrate the possibility of self-organization in 
the formation of a complex polity (Froese et al. 2014). These studies do not involve Big 
Data, and network science also applies to small groups (Katz et al. 2004) as well as 
individual psychological phenomena. However, uses of quantitative models in social 
science are expected to vastly increase as network science and other tools for 
manipulating Big Data are developed (Watts 2007; Lazer et al. 2009).2  
It is the intersection of socially generated Big Data and network science that 
generates the conceptual issue raised here. Big Data may make a similar impact 
elsewhere, but this specific area of overlap can make the problem for our concepts of the 
human particularly clear. To date, it is relatively sparsely populated by published 
                                                
2 Social connectionism involves the use of connectionist models for social psychology – 
for example, connectionist models of how individuals form prejudices (Van Rooy et al. 
2003). The focus here is on social structures (e.g., a racist society) rather than individual 
cognition (e.g., a racist individual). That said, the morals of this paper also apply to 
psychology (Figdor forthcoming).  
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studies.3 In one such study, for example, Mateos et al. 2011 used network analysis of an 
online database of 300 million names from 26 countries and 4 continents (as well as a 
local naming network in Auckland, New Zealand) to reveal how cultural, ethnic, and 
linguistic communities can persist even after geographical dispersal. Still, the potential 
problem can be foreseen just given how quantitative models are used throughout science. 
 
Part 2. The Conceptual Problem 
In its essence, the problem is a familiar one of whether and how to revise old 
categories in the face of new similarities. As an intuitive example, if advanced computing 
devices are able to do much of what human minds can do, are they really intelligent or do 
they only simulate intelligence? Answers to this question are a matter of categorization, 
which we capture in words ("intelligent") or concepts (INTELLIGENT). 4  Not all 
conceptual border disputes are significant. Whether a particular new item of furniture 
counts as a chair (falls under the concept CHAIR) doesn't matter to most of us, although 
it can matter to some of us (e.g., if you are a furniture importer, and chairs are subject to 
                                                
3 That said, the Santa Fe Institute (https://www.santafe.edu/research/projects/hidden-
laws-in-biological-and-social-systems) comprises one group of researchers dedicated to 
this sort of cross-domain research. Regardless, the field is in its infancy.  
4 I adopt the convention of using all capital letters to denote concepts (e.g. FISH) and 
mention quotes to denote predicates (e.g., "fish", "pesce"). The differences between 
concepts (FISH), predicates ("fish"), and categories (which are denoted by either) won't 
matter here. Also, a standard distinction in philosophy of language is drawn between 
sense and reference – the meaning of a term and what it refers to. For example, "the 
morning star" and "the evening star" are names with the same reference – the planet 
Venus – but different meanings. For predicates, a corresponding distinction holds 
between extension (a set of entities) and intension (a property shared by the members of 
the set). For example, the extension of "fish" is the set of all individual fish, and its 
intention is the property shared by fish (call it Fishness). As before, predicates with 
different intensions (meanings) can have the same extension (reference). My focus here is 
on the reference (or extension) of predicates or concepts. For some theorists, reference 
exhausts meaning anyway. 
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import tariffs). Social categories, however, matter to almost everyone. Is marriage only 
between a man and a woman? What is it to belong to the black race – if there is such a 
thing? Can an Alzheimer's patient's relationship with a robot caregiver be a real 
friendship, or is the patient being exploited? (Sparrow and Sparrow 2006). If humans 
have legal standing because they have advanced cognitive capacities, does a chimpanzee 
whose cognitive capacities are more advanced than those of a cognitively disabled human 
have legal standing (The Nonhuman Rights Project)? Of course, a single case that 
conflicts with implicit assumptions about category boundaries (e.g. one gay couple that 
wants to marry) may not suffice to raise the question of the adequacy of those boundaries, 
let alone their revision. But individual cases can be very influential, and it is hard to 
ignore many cases of the same type. It is thus likely that at least some studies in 
computational social science (to borrow Lazer's label) will at least raise the problem. 
To see how, consider some general features of mathematical models and 
modeling practices.5 A mathematical model has two basic elements: a structure, and an 
interpretation or construal. For example, without an interpretation or construal to link the 
mathematical equations to the world, the equations are not about anything at all. 
Similarly, networks have nodes and edges as their structural features, but what the nodes 
and edges represent is a matter of their interpretation. Following Weisberg 2013, the 
construal includes the modeler’s specification of which real-world system the model is 
                                                
5 Not all models are mathematical (e.g. scale models, animal models). However, I am 
construing "mathematical" models all those which can be described using equations or 
other mathematical tools (e.g. connectionist networks or computational models). In 
philosophical terms, mathematical equations are descriptions of models, although 
scientists often call the equations themselves models. Mathematical models can also be 
depicted in various ways – i.e. by standard graphs with x- and y-axes, and by network 
graphs with nodes and edges. 
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intended to represent, along with specification of which aspects of the target the modeler 
will focus on and the criteria used to evaluate the goodness of fit between the model and 
the target system. These criteria establish how much the model can vary from the target 
in the specified respects without ceasing to be a model of it. A simple illustration of these 
concepts is the Lotka-Volterra model of the dynamical relation between the sizes of 
populations of predators and prey. This is often presented as a set of linked equations:  
 
The equations were developed with populations of fish in the Adriatic sea as the intended 
assignment, focusing on their relative sizes. In the standard construal, V represents the 
size of the prey fish population (e.g., cod), P the size of the predator population (e.g., 
sharks); the parameter r represents the intrinsic growth rate of the prey population, m the 
intrinsic mortality rate of the predators, a the capture rate of prey, and b the birth rate of 
predators.6 The model is typically described as a model of predator-prey relations. Lotka 
and Volterra intended the variables V and P to represent certain populations of fish (as 
captured in the concepts SHARK and COD) and the concepts PREDATOR and PREY 
characterize the relationship between these fish populations. 
 It is a common modeling practice to use mathematical models for systems other 
than the ones for which they were initially developed. For example, the Lotka-Volterra 
                                                
6 Equation (1) equates the change in prey population over time to the difference between 
its intrinsic growth rate and the rate at which prey are captured by predators. Equation (2) 
equates the change of predator population over time to the difference between the birth 
rate of predators and the predator mortality rate. The equations are linked in that the 
conversion of dead prey into baby predators in equation (2) is a function of the capture of 
prey by predators in equation (1).  
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equations were quickly used by others to capture the relative sizes of populations of 
wolves and moose. This switch in construal from populations of fish to populations of 
land mammals is permissible (indeed, unremarkable) because wolves are already in the 
extension of PREDATOR and moose in the extension of PREY. But the Lotka-Volterra 
equations have been used to capture relationships between plant species, wage levels and 
jobs, and capillary tips and chemoattractant in wound-healing angiogenesis (Arora and 
Boer 2006; Goodwin 1967; Pettet, McElwain, and Norbury 2000). Unlike the prior 
extension to wolves and moose, these cases are conceptually problematic. Are plants, 
wages, and capillary tips predators? What evidence is relevant to our decision? The point 
here is not to answer these metaphysical and epistemological questions, but to show how 
they arise due to ordinary modeling practices in science. The intuitive examples given 
above of marriage, caregiving, and legal standing are simpler examples, but the basic 
problem is the same. In fact, with models in science it is arguably worse. Mathematical 
models provide scientifically grounded insight into important structural similarities that 
can cross-cut pre-existing categories. They also don't have a priori restrictions regarding 
the domains to which they may be fruitfully applied. 
 Enterprising scientists have long taken advantage of these features. For example, 
Ratcliff's (1978) drift-diffusion model of decision-making explains differences in 
response times and accuracy in making simple decisions depending on the quality of the 
relevant information. For example, subjects who must decide whether a test picture 
matches a sample can decide more quickly and with greater accuracy if the test picture is 
sharp rather than blurred. This cognitive model was originally developed based on data 
from human subjects. But it has also been used, inter alia, for macaque monkeys and fruit 
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flies (Shadlen and Newsome 1996; Dasgupta et al 2014). Again: do macaques and fruit 
flies really make decisions? What evidence is relevant in making this determination?7  
The intersection of socially derived Big Data and network science promise to 
raise these same questions for social concepts. As a result, when models of human social 
interactions are extended to nonhuman domains, the assumption that these social 
interactions are specifically human can no longer be taken for granted. As noted, such 
models need not be based on Big Data, although they may subsequently be tested and 
revised using Big Datasets from larger, real-world human social groups. For example, 
Guimera et al. 2015's model of the assembly of creative teams is based on counting the 
numbers of collaborators in Broadway musicals and selected academic journal 
publications. Their model predicted team member selection based on three parameters: 
team size, the fraction of newcomers in new outcomes, and the tendency of team 
incumbents to select past collaborators. This model could be tested with much larger 
populations and revised or elaborated in various ways as a result. Plant biologists have 
already considered that the concept of facilitation should be employed for plants, in 
addition to competition (Bruno et al. 2003). If Guimera et al.'s model or some revised 
version of it is successfully extended to plant populations, should we also consider some 
plants as newcomers and others as incumbents, and consider whether plant collaboration 
promotes creative innovation and formation of group knowledge? If the model is robust 
with Big Datasets from much larger scale human groups, and it is then extended to large 
nonhuman groups, such as bacteria, do these same concepts apply to them as well?  
                                                
7 Elsewhere (Figdor forthcoming) I argue that they really do make decisions. In this 
paper, my goal is not to defend an interpretation of social concepts bur rather to show 
what the overlap of Big Data and network science implies for the likelihood that we will 
be facing a lot more of these sorts of conceptual issues in very short order. 
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Similarly, Froese et al.'s (2014) computational (connectionist) model of a self-
organizing decentralized system of government may eventually be tested using Big 
Datasets from real-world complex political organizations. The social categories of rulers, 
elites, priests, coalitions, and representatives are all implicated in the model. If the same 
model turns out to have real-world application to some bacteria colonies, it suggests that 
we might conceptualize these colonies as political entities, and that relationships of social 
influence and collaboration naturally extend to many nonhuman groups. Mateo et al. 
2011's study of naming networks in dispersed human populations brings in concepts of 
cultural, ethnic and religious affiliations that persist through dispersion. We don't usually 
label nonhumans with names (other than pets or particularly outstanding members of wild 
species). But given some analogous labeling schema, the same networks might be found 
in nonhuman populations, with the corresponding question of which of the associated 
cultural, ethnic or religious categories might also be extended. 
Finally, to explore the issue in detail, consider a hypothetical case of a single 
business and the complex relations between the individuals who work in it, the other 
organizations with which it competes, cooperates, and compares itself to, the institutional 
and regulatory structures in which it operates, and the interactions between these factors 
(Watts 2007). The Big Data generated by this business might be used to formulate a 
network model that captures the dynamical changes in social relationships within 
businesses that grow from two founders to dozens of employees as well as their 
relationships with other businesses. It reliably predicts which businesses are more likely 
to adjust to changing internal social dynamics and which are not, holding constant other 
features that affect success at any specified rate of financial growth. It distinguishes the 
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formal positions as well as the major characteristics of and informal relationships (the 
"unwritten rules" and patterns of influence) between the people that fill them. Some 
individuals are influential, some marginalized; some are mentors, others malingerers. The 
model provides deeper understanding of the interplay of character and informal 
relationships in organizational success and failure. It might show how individual features 
and social relationships of people occupying formally identical roles in closely-matched 
businesses have very different outcomes.  
An enterprising microbiologist might well take this model and use it successfully 
to predict the growth and survival of bacteria colonies in a dynamic ecosystem that – like 
an economy – is sometimes favorable and sometimes harsh.8 The model is able to predict 
which colonies will thrive and which will not, holding constant other features that affect 
success (such as amount of available nutrients). Assume the biologist is able to 
distinguish bacteria within the colony (or perhaps small clusters of them) and assign them 
to various roles with different responsibilities within the colony in such a way that 
(ceteris paribus) the survival of the colony can be explained by the different ways in 
which the bacteria filling these roles interact with each other. The microbiologist adopts 
the same concepts for the roles and the personal characteristics to describe the various 
bacteria clusters. For example, some bacteria are senior mentors of junior-level bacteria. 
Her ability to use the model licenses (but does not establish) the extensions of these 
social concepts to the new domain. The equations establish a formal similarity between 
                                                
8 Note that some bacteria colonies are already considered predatory (e.g. Velicer et al. 
2000), while others are described as communicating linguistically and making collective 
decisions (Ben Jacob et al. 2004). 
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humans and bacteria at a social level. Does it make sense to say that some bacteria really 
are mentors of junior members of the organization? How do we decide? 
We tend to think of the behavior of nonhuman groups in purely evolutionary 
terms. We explain their behavior in terms of biological fitness. The applicability of social 
science models of real-world human social networks and relationships to nonhumans 
would suggest that this reductive attitude is as mistaken for nonhumans as we think it is 
for humans. We would be missing an important level of analysis of nonhuman behavior 
that corresponds to the social level in humans. The more we are able to model the 
features and relationships that underlie social concepts using socially derived Big Data, 
the greater the potential for social conceptual extension. 
Perhaps right now it intuitively seems too much of a stretch to extend social 
concepts to nonhumans. But usage can change. Witness the term "computer" (or the 
concept COMPUTER): now it is debated whether humans are computers, when originally 
humans were the only computers. So the immediate conceptual shock of thinking of a 
cluster of bacteria as a senior mentor of a junior-level cluster does not decide the matter. 
From the point of view of Big Data-driven models, the bacteria fill the formal roles and 
establish informal relationships in such a way that the whole colony and its growth and 
survival can be seen as instantiating a form of social complexity that we formerly 
associated just with humans. There are obvious differences between bacteria and humans, 
but the question is whether these differences matter for understanding the relationships 
between humans in a business and between bacteria in a colony.  
Of course, there is no guarantee that quantitative models developed from real-
world human social data will apply elsewhere. It may be that the only models that do are 
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so abstract that they do not raise significant conceptual puzzles. For example, we already 
know that human social networks are like many others in that they contain hubs with 
many more connections than average, yet this fact is hardly cause for conceptual concern. 
Still, if computational social science is just around the corner, so too is the possibility of 
social conceptual extension and revision. 
 
Part 3. The Disruptive Potential for Traditional Humanistic Concerns 
What counts as a real social relationship, a real social role, a real social emotion? 
As noted, it is often far from trivial whether we either exclude something from or include 
something in a social category. However, social categories of mentor or incumbent and 
social relations of having influence or collaborating may not be considered particularly 
humanistic even if they paradigmatically involve humans. In this section, I'll consider 
briefly the potential problem in relation to two traditionally humanistic concerns: the 
nature of personhood, and the nature of moral standing. For any theory in which standing 
in a social relationship is constitutive of being a person or having moral standing, 
changes in social category boundaries have important ethical implications. We may 
consider ourselves downgraded by recognizing a similarity to something we consider 
inferior, and may fear how we might be treated as a result given our own treatment of 
other animals. By considering two such theories, I can illustrate how the extension of 
social concepts to nonhuman domains has the potential to affect our conceptions of what 
it is to be human. We may not care much if bacteria are mentors. But what if a detailed 
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social network model that also fits bacteria-colony behavior suggests that we should 
extend the concept of personhood to them as well?9 
Baker (2015), building on earlier work (e.g., Baker 2000) argues that individual 
human persons are social entities, because human persons have robust first-person 
perspectives, acquiring such perspectives requires acquiring a language, and language is 
social – it requires a linguistic community. Persons could not exist in a world without 
social or linguistic communities. On her view, there are both rudimentary and robust 
first-person perspectives (more precisely, stages of development of first-person 
perspectives). The rudimentary stage involves a nonconceptual capacity for intentional 
behavior that requires consciousness and intentionality – for example, avoiding pain. 
Nonhuman mammals can develop this perspective, but for them it is "the end of the first-
person line" (op.cit.: 79). The robust stage involves developing a capacity to conceive of 
oneself as oneself from the first-person. This capacity for self-conception is acquired by 
acquiring a natural language. Persons have self-concepts, which requires having 
concepts, which requires having language. Without this capacity, "there would be no 
significant distinction between human persons and nonhuman primates" (op.cit.: 79): 
Robust first-person perspectives enable us to realize we are agents, to take 
responsibility for things that we do, to recognize that we are subjects of 
experience, to care about the future, to change our habits in the light of rational 
assessments of our goals. These abilities – made possible by our robust first-
person perspectives – are unique (as far as we know) in the universe. …[O]ur 
robust first-person perspectives set us apart from everything else in the natural 
world. (op.cit.: 80). 
 
                                                
9 I am not endorsing these theories, and they are not the only ones in which social 
relationships play a critical role. For example, Brandom (1994) makes social relations 
constitutive of conceptual thought and language; Schechtman 2014 defines persons in 
terms of social interactions and structures; and Kittay 2005 argues for the importance of 
social relationships in moral standing. I use them to illustrate the general point. 
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The potential for disruption is entailed by the final sentences – the idea that this suite of 
capacities derived from a capacity to acquire natural language, is unique to us as far as 
we know. Because our specialness is closely linked to the uniqueness of possession, any 
change in the boundaries of the relevant concepts is highly threatening, even though 
extending a category to nonhumans is not a zero-sum game. (If fruit flies make decisions, 
it does not follow that we no longer do.)  
 Unfortunately, the origins and extent of language capacities are a thriving 
research area, and will only grow given network science and Big Data derived from 
linguistic networks (e.g. Mehler 2007, Baronchelli et al. 2006). Some in microbiology 
already argue that bacteria communicate linguistically (Ben Jacob et al. 2004). Animal 
researchers have reported that chimpanzees in an immigrant troop learn to change the 
pitch of their food calls to converge with those of a host troop, and that the change in 
vocalization coincided with greater social integration and the formation of strong social 
ties between members of the original subgroups (Watson et al. 2015; see also Harms 
2004). If language is not unique to humans, Baker's theory of what makes humans 
persons fails to restrict personhood to humans. 
A second (although related) humanistic concern involves moral standing, the 
status one possesses for being subject to moral consideration. If an entity has moral 
standing, either directly or indirectly, we may not treat it any way we please (Warren 
1997: 3). For example, a human being cannot be killed for food, while a cow can, 
because the human has moral status that the cow lacks. On Jaworska and Tannenbaum's 
(2014) view, higher moral status accrues to humans above nonhumans because the 
former can participate as rearees in person-rearing relationships and thus potentially 
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attain the status of being a self-standing person ("SSP"). On this view, certain social 
relationships confer moral standing. 
Jaworska and Tannenbaum agree that sophisticated cognitive capacities, such as 
the capacity to reason, to be self-aware, and to care, ground the higher moral status that 
accrues to humans or anything that has them. However, on their view, moral status can 
also be conferred by a capacity that is "deeply relational" in that its exercise requires 
active participation of another. The paradigm is a parent-child relationship between non-
cognitively impaired humans. In these relationships, the child learns by practice to do the 
activities that characterize self-standing persons (for example, doing simple rule-abiding 
activities that are models for practical deliberation at a later age). The parent engages 
with the child in these activities with the end in mind of raising a self-standing person. 
Importantly, even if the child does not or cannot complete the process, she is already 
participating in the form of life of SSPs – there must be some non-zero probability of the 
rearee's becoming a SSP, but her activities can fall short of completion.10 This kind of 
person-rearing relationship suffices to confer on the rearee the higher moral status, even 
if she is too cognitively impaired to ever achieve self-standing personhood and even if the 
rearer is a guardian or an institution. Most animals are omitted because few animal 
owners engage with them with the aim of raising self-standing persons, but also because 
engaging in the activities with them has zero probability of turning them into SSPs. As 
they put it, "evidence abounds that turning cats and dogs into SSPs is impossible" (2014: 
                                                
10 On their view (op.cit.: 254, fn. 23), "a form of life is given by the practice or activity 
manifested in that life; the end informs (and forms) what the activity is, and so constitutes 
that kind of life."  
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258) – they do not have the capacities to engage in the kinds of activities that a rearer can 
transform into those characteristic of SSPs. 
Jaworska and Tannenbaum's account makes standing in certain social relations 
necessary if not sufficient to confer moral standing. In this case, the social relations are 
paradigmatically small – one rearer and one rearee – but the possibility of institutions as 
rearers, as well as multiple rearees, shows that the relevant relations can in fact be many-
many. It follows that the sorts of conceptual extensions discussed above could expand the 
range of entities that have moral standing beyond what we currently envision. As we saw 
with Baker, their disclaimer about evidence showing what is impossible for nonhumans is 
telling. The age of computational social science has barely begun. It is not impossible that 
real-world social systems of the rearer-rearee sort (e.g., a communal nursery on an Israeli 
kibbutz) may generate Big Data about those relationships (from personal devices as well 
as networked technology) that can be used to develop models for predicting various 
successful outcomes for rearees, including severely impaired rearees. If the relationships 
are constitutive of moral standing, rather than the normal cognitive capacities, then it is 
an empirical issue as to whether these social relations are restricted to humans. These 
models extended to nonhuman groups would provide evidence of what nonhumans are 
capable of, as rearees or rearers.  
 
Conclusion. 
Although much current controversy over Big Data-driven research deals with 
pressing ethical and legal issues, fundamental conceptual issues are just around the 
corner. Once we have used socially-derived Big Data to elaborate, develop, or test 
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mathematical models of human social relationships and their dynamics, it is predictable 
that scientists will use these models to understand relationships in other real-world 
complex systems. If they are successful, these nonhuman domains would have important 
structural similarities to our own that raise the question of whether human social concepts 
extend to them. There is no one answer to this problem, nor have I advocated for one. My 
goal has been to show that and how such conceptual issues will arise given the new social 
science research possibilities afforded by Big Data and network science. If these social 
relationships and catogories are not uniquely human, what is it to be human? 
 
 
References 
 
Aral, S. and D. Walker (2012). Identifying Influential and Susceptible Members of Social 
Networks. Science 337: 337-341. 
 
Arora, V. and G. Boer (2006). Simulating Competition and Coexistence Between Plant 
 Functional Types in a Dynamic Vegetation Model. Earth Interactions 10: Paper 
 No. 10. 
 
Baker, L. (2000). Persons and Bodies: A constitution view. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Baker, L. (2015). Human Persons as Social Entities. Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1): 77-
87. 
 
Barabasi, A.-L. and R. Albert (1999). Emergence of scaling in random networks. Science 
286: 509-512. 
 
Baronchelli, A., R. Ferrer-i-Cancho, R. Pastor-Satorras, N. Chater, and M. Christiansen 
(2013). Networks in Cognitive Science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (7): 348-
360.  
 
Baronchelli, A., M. Felici, V. Loreto, E. Caglioti, and L. Steels (2006). Sharp Transition 
Towards Shared Vocabulary in Multi-Agent Systems. arXiv:physics/0509075v2. 
 
Ben-Jacob, E., I. Becker, Y. Shapira, and H. Levine (2004). Bacterial linguistic 
 communication and social intelligence. Trends in Microbiology 12 (8): 366-372. 
 19 
 
Bentley, R.A., M. O'Brien, and W. Brock (2014). Mapping Collective Behavior in the 
Big-Data Era. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37: 63-119. 
 
Boden, M. (1996). Creativity and Artificial Intelligence. Artificial Intelligence 103: 347-
 356.  
 
Brandom, R. (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive 
 Commitment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Bullmore, E. and O. Sporns (2009). Complex Brain Networks: Graph theoretical analysis 
of structural and functional systems. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 10: 186-198. 
 
Castellano, C., S. Fortunato, and V. Loreto (2009). Statistical Physics of Social 
Dynamics. arXiv:0710.3256v2. 
 
Dasgupta, S., C. Ferreira, and G. Miesenböck (2014). FoxP influences the speed and 
 accuracy of a perceptual decision in Drosophila. Science 344: 901-04. 
 
Figdor, C. (forthcoming). Pieces of Mind: the proper domain of psychological predicates. 
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press). 
 
Froese, T., C. Gershenson, and L. Manzanilla (2014). Can Government Be Self-
Organized? A mathematical model of the collective social organization of ancient 
Teotihuacan, Central Mexico. PLoS One 9 (10): e109966. 
 
Gantz, J. and D. Reinsel (2011). Extracting Value from Chaos. Downloaded July 9, 2016: 
https://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/idc-extracting-value-from-chaos-
ar.pdf 
 
Golder, S. and M. Macy (2011). Diurnal and Seasonal Mood Vary with Work, Sleep, and 
Daylength Across Diverse Cultures. Science 333: 1878-1881. 
 
Goodwin, R. (1967). A Growth Cycle. In C. Feinstein, ed., Socialism, Capitalism, and 
 Economic Growth. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Guimerà, R., B. Uzzi, J. Spiro, and L. Nunes Amaral (2005). Team Assembly 
 Mechanisms Determine Collaboration Network Structure and Team Performance. 
 Science New Series 308 (5722): 697-702. 
 
Harms, W. (2004). Primitive content, translation, and the emergence of meaning in 
 animal communication. In D. Kimbrough Oller and U. Griebel, eds., Evolution of 
 Communication Systems: A comparative approach (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press): 
 31-48. 
 
Jaworska, A. and J. Tannenbaum (2014). Person-Rearing Relationships as a Key to 
 20 
 Higher Moral Status. Ethics 124 (2): 242-271.  
Katz, N., D. Lazer, H. Arrow, and N. Contractor (2004). Network theory and small 
 groups. Small Group Research 35 (3): 307-322. 
 
Kittay, E. (2005). At the Margins of Moral Personhood. Ethics 116: 100-131. 
 
Kossinets, G. and D. Watts (2009). Origins of Homophily in an Evolving Social 
Network. American Journal of Sociology 115 (2): 405-500. 
 
Lazer, D., A. Pentland, L. Adamic, S. Aral, A.-L. Barabasi, D. Brewer, N. Christakis, N. 
Contractor, J. Fowler, M. Gutmann, T. Jebara, G. King, M. Macy, D. Roy, and M. 
Alastyne (2009). Computational Social Science. Science 323: 721-723. 
  
McMahan, J. (2005). Our Fellow Creatures. The Journal of Ethics 9: 353-380. 
 
Mason, W., A. Jones, and R. Goldstone (2008). Propagation of Innovation in Networked 
Groups. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 173 (3): 422-433.  
 
Mateos, P., P. Longley, and D. O'Sullivan (2011). Ethnicity and Population Structure in 
 Naming Networks. PLoS ONE 6 (9): e22493. 
 
Mayer, J., P. Mutchler, and J. Mitchell (2016). Evaluating the Privacy Properties of 
Telephone Metadata. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 113 
(20):  5536-5541. 
 
Mehler, A. (2007). Large Text Networks as an Object of Corpus Linguistic Studies. In A. 
Lüdeling and M. Kytö, eds., Corpus Linguistics: An international handbook of the 
science of language and society. (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter): 328-382. 
 
Nardini, C., B. Kozma, and A. Barrat (2008). Who's Talking First? Consensus Formation 
or Lack Thereof in Coevolving Opinion Formation Networks. Physical Review 
Letters 100: 158701.  
 
Onnela, J.-P. and F. Reed-Tsochas (2010). Spontaneous Emergence of Social Influence in 
Online Systems. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 107: 
18375-18380. 
 
Pettet, G., D. McElwain, and J. Norbury (2000). Lotka-Volterra Equations with 
 Chemotaxis: Walls,  Barriers and Travelling Waves. IMA Journal of 
 Mathematics Applied in Medicine and Biology 27: 395-413. 
 
Press, G. (2014). 12 Big Data Definitions: What's yours? Forbes Magazine, Sept. 3: 
 http://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2014/09/03/12-big-data-definitions-whats-
yours/#25517fdf21a9. Accessed on Feb. 4, 2017. 
 
 21 
Ratcliff, R. (1978). A Theory of Memory Retrieval. Psychological Review 85 (2): 59-
108. 
 
Roesch, E., F. Stahl, and M. Gaber (2014). Bigger data for big data: From Twitter to 
brain-computer interfaces. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (1): 97-98. 
 
Salganik, M., P. Dodds, and D. Watts (2006). Experimental study of inequality and 
unpredictability in an artificial cultural market. Science 311 (5762): 854-856. 
 
Schechtman, M. (2014). Staying Alive: Personal identity, practical concerns, and the 
unity of a life. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Shadlen, M. and W. Newsome (1996). Motion perception: seeing and deciding. 
 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA 93: 628-633.  
 
Sparrow, R. and L. Sparrow (2006). In the hands of machines? The future of aged care. 
Minds and Machines 16: 141-161. 
 
Stahl, F., M. Gaber, M. Bramer, and P. Yu (2010). Pocket Data Mining: Towards 
Collaborate Data Mining in Mobile Computing Environments. Proceedings of the 
Twenty-Second IEEE International Conference on Tools and Artificial 
Intelligence. Downloaded July 9, 2016: http://eprints.port.ac.uk/3248/1/pdm1.pdf 
 
Van Rooy, D., F. Van Overwalle, T. Vanoomissen, C. Labiouse, and R. French (2003). A 
 recurrent connectionist model of group biases. Psychological Review 110 (3): 
 536-563. 
 
Velicer, G., L. Kroos, and R. Lenski (2000). Developmental cheating in the social 
 bacterium Myxococcus xanthus. Nature 404: 598-601. 
 
Warren, M. (1997). Moral Status: Obligations to persons and other living things. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Watson, S., S. Townsend, A. Schel, C. Wilke, E. Wallace, L. Cheng, V. West, and K. 
Slocombe (2015). Vocal Learning in the Functionally Referential Food Grunts of 
Chimpanzees. Current Biology 25: 495-499. 
 
Watts, D. (2007). A Twenty-First Century Science. Nature 445: 489. 
 
Weisberg, M. (2013). Simulation and Similarity. New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Wu, F. and B. Huberman (2007). Novelty and Collective Attention. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences USA 104: 17599-17601.  
 
